Abstract-
Introduction
Many applications like pay-per-view, distribution of digital media etc., require secure multicast services in order to restrict group membership and enforce accountability of group members. A major issue associated with the deployment of secure multicast delivery services is the scalability of the key distribution scheme. This is particularly true with regard to the handling of group membership changes, such as membership departures and/or expulsions, which necessitate the distribution of a new session key to all the remaining group members.
As the frequency of group membership change increases, it becomes necessary to reduce the cost of key distribution operations. One solution is to let all authorized members use a shared key to encrypt the multicast data. To provide backward and forward confidentiality (D.M. Wallner and Agee, 1999) , this shared key has to be updated on every membership change and redistributed to all authorized members securely which is referred to as rekeying. The efficiency of rekeying is an important issue in secure multicast as this is the most frequently performed activity with dynamic change in the membership.
Group key must be updated with the group membership changes to prevent a new member from deciphering messages exchanged before it join the group; this is defined as backward secrecy [3] . Group key revocation in case of one member joins or multiple members join could be achieved by sending the new group key to the old group members encrypted with the old group key. Also, group key must be must be updated with the group membership changes to prevent an old member (leaved or expelled) from deciphering current and future communication which is defined as forward secrecy [3] . Group key revocation, when one member leaves or multiple members leave, is more complicated in case of join because of the disclosure of the old group key. The old group key is known to the leaving member(s) so there is a need to re-key the group using valid key(s) in a scalable way. The trivial scheme for rekeying a group of n members is through using individual secret key shared between the Key distribution Centre KDC and each member. This is not a simple or scalable method and consumed large bandwidth especially for large group with high membership changes: furthermore it takes more time and needs more resources per hosts than using multicasting to re-key the group.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II discusses related work. The multicast key management scheme is presented in Section III. Section IV describes the algorithm that uses the Boolean function simplification techniques called tabulation method to minimize the number of rekeying operations.
Section V analyzes the performance of the proposed scheme, followed by the conclusion in Section VI.
Related Works
The topics of key management for multiparty communications in general networks are studied and one of the efficient key tree based group key management technique called Logical Key Hierarchy (LKH) is discussed [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6] . A key update in this scheme requires O(log 2 N) messages where N is the size of the group. In this scheme each user has to store log 2 N keys (i.e., keys along the path from leaf to the root) and the key server has to maintain a tree of O (N) keys.
The scheme proposed in uses the LKH scheme and uses a binary tree, but with only two keys at every level.
This reduces total number of keys at the server from O(N) to O(h) where h is the height of the tree. But storage at each user remains at O(log 2 N). The scheme discussed and extends the scheme to m-ary tree instead of binary tree, which reduces the user side storage from O(log 2 N) as to O(log m N) [2] . In tree based key management schemes each user shares a key called private key with the key server and key at the root of the tree is the group key which is shared by all users in the group. Other keys (other than private key and group key) are called auxiliary keys (key encryption keys) which are known only for certain subset of users and are used to encrypt new group key whenever there is a group membership change. The scheme uses m-ary tree and at each level m keys are maintained. Whenever a node is compromised new group key is selected and distributed to other nodes.
The encryption keys that are required to send new group key GKnew securely are computed. The new group key is distributed to group members without performing any encryptions. Our scheme distributes new group key to the remaining group members with minimum number of messages as compared to the scheme in [7] . In our scheme, in order to avoid the leaving members using auxiliary keys to learn the new group key, auxiliary keys are also updated.
Multicast Key Management Scheme
In our scheme each member of the group is associated with a unique user ID (UID) which is a binary string of length n. Consequently, a UID can be written as X n-1 X n-2 X 0 , where X i can be either 0 or 1. Using In [3] binary tree structure is used. When the group is large, the number of levels in the binary tree will be more which increases number of keys at member.
Extending the scheme to m-ary tree will reduce the height of the tree reducing number of keys at each member. At the same time we should consider server side storage i.e., number of keys at every level of the key tree.
(i) each interior node has at most m children
(ii) each path from the root to a leaf has the same length N: Total number of members associated with the group.
Each member is assigned with Unique Identification Number (UID) which is a binary string of length n (where n= log 2 N). i.e., knew H(ks) k comm
Subgroups

Key Distribution
The encryption keys computed using the method of (auxiliary key) (new group key). Second, every key used to compute the hash value is incremented by one (1). In this scheme to communicate new group key securely we are not using any encryption instead all communications are by using hash values and XOR operations which will reduce the communication overhead i.e., rekeying cost is reduced.
Individual Member Removal
When a member of a multicast group is to be expelled, e.g., because its subscription has expired, a new session key needs to be distributed to every member except the one leaving to make sure that the expelled member can no longer receive and send data addressed 
Two members removal (leave) at a time
When two members leave the multicast group voluntarily or being removed from the group, we need to address three different cases: 
TABULATION METHOD
Snowballing member removal
Any number of members can leave (be removed from) the multicast group from any position in our 
Determination of prime implicants
PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
To achieve message confidentiality in Secure Group
Communication we require a group key and the group key should be updated whenever a node is compromised.
In our scheme server is required to store (log 2 N * m) keys, along with the Group Key GK, where as the scheme in [7] requires O (N) keys to be stored at the server. The binary tree concept discussed in [8] is efficiently extended to m-ary tree in this paper with 
CONCLUSION
The rationale behind the definition of optimality is that typically the cost of an additional gate is several times that of an additional input on an already existing gate and, hence, elimination of gates is the primary objective of the simplification process. Interestingly, the same definition of optimality is also applicable to our problem. The argument in our case is that the complexity of sending an additional message is far greater than that of adding an extra key ID in the message to indicate that the key should be used as input in deriving a new key.
The proposed scheme is based on KM-BFM scheme.
Instead of using one tree as in KM-BFM, the members 
